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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the main features of the pension reform approved in 2003 in 
Slovakia. It evaluates adopted measures according to (1) motivation to pay social 
contributions, (2) guarantees of financial stability, (3) transition costs and (4) ability to 
provide adequate pensions. It shows that the reform has positive motivation effects 
and increases systems’ overall stability through the risk diversification between labor 
and capital markets. In the following decade, prolonging of retirement age should 
secure system’s financial stability. Later on, demography crisis might reveal too high 
generosity and un-sustainability of the “Pay-As-You-Go” (PAYG) pillar. Allowing for 
capital transfers, a new mandatory “Fully-Funded” (FF) pillar moderates these threats. 
However, the rule that binds at least 50% of investment portfolio to Slovak securities 
dilutes its strengths considerably. Together with the need to finance transition costs 
and with the uncertain capital markets’ development, these are the main risks marking 
the reform proposal. To secure long-term financial stability, another reform of the 
PAYG including further prolonging of retirement age and/or change in the pension 
formula would be necessary. The recommendations are to introduce the automatic 
stabilizers (i.e. automatic parametric reforms of the PAYG), to shift further towards 
the “Defined-Contribution” PAYG plans and to decrease or abolish 50% investment 
restriction in the FF pillar.  
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Introduction 
 
The individual is able to smooth his lifetime consumption by saving some of the 
income during his working years and contributing it to a pension scheme, instead of 
consuming everything. Such redistribution over time contributes to preventing old-age 
poverty. There are two ways (Barr, 1998) of obtaining a claim on future output, either 
by saving a stock of money (fully-funded or FF scheme), or by social insurance, i.e. 
purchasing a promise of a share on future production (un-funded; pay-as-you-go or 
PAYG scheme). In the funded scheme the workers save part of their income and 
accumulate these savings in order to use them after retirement. The PAYG scheme is 
based on an intergenerational exchange, when current workers insure themselves by 
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paying out current pensioners and thus “buying” a promise to be paid later in their 
retirement age by the young generation.  
 
Different countries have a broad variety of pension systems relying on the PAYG or 
the FF schemes or the combination of both. Traditionally, the continental Europe has 
its mandatory pension plans based mainly on the PAYG. The idea comes from 
Bismarck’s Germany of 19th century when the average life expectancy did not 
substantially exceed the retirement age. As a result the state PAYG schemes generated 
surplus used among others to fight the old-age poverty. This kind of pension system 
has soon spread across the world and remains crucial almost everywhere. The PAYG 
varies from “flat-rate” systems1 (e.g. United Kingdom, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Denmark) providing a basic income irrespective of wages earned or 
contributions made, to an “earnings-related“ systems2 (e.g. Germany, Italy, France, 
Austria, Sweden) where pensions are related to past earnings, while at the same time a 
minimum pension is preserved (Economic Policy Committee, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, some of the countries, where capital markets played traditionally 
important role in the economy, have at least partially relied on accumulation of 
savings and investing them. This happened usually in cooperation with employers 
who for this purpose created a variety of pension funds. Such countries, including 
USA, Great Britain and Netherlands, have developed a combination of usually “flat-
rate” PAYG and (either mandatory or voluntary) funded plans. 
 
In 1981 South-American Chile allowed for diverting all contributions from the PAYG 
to the mandatory and private FF scheme. Thus it began to accumulate individual 
savings on personal accounts and investing them in the capital market securities. This 
was the first country in the world that implemented such a reform. Since then, Chile 
has more than twenty-year record that shows remarkable success in terms of returns 
and amount of pensions (Acuna, Iglesias, 2001). This has made a strong impression 
on many other countries. Beginning with its South-American neighbors (e.g. Peru – 
1993, Argentina, Colombia – 1994, Uruguay – 1996, Bolivia, Mexico – 1997), many 
of them have decided to undergo such a reform and to close or at least diminish their 
PAYG. Facing the ageing population problem and high unemployment that both 
impose financial burden on the PAYG this solution has become attractive and has 
been at least partially implemented also in many post-communist countries (e.g. 
Kazakhstan, Hungary – 1998, Poland – 1999, Latvia – 2001, Croatia, Estonia, Russia 
– 2002) and in some western democracies (Denmark – 1983, Switzerland, 
Netherlands – 1985, Great Britain – 1988, Australia – 1991, Sweden – 1996). Most of 
them have created a combined system based on both the PAYG and the FF pillars. 
 
However, not all countries are delighted with the idea of substituting their PAYG with 
the mandatory funding. Without any doubt, efficient PAYG has strong advantages 
(Chapter 2) that might explain its solid position in the continental Europe and 
                                                          
1 A “flat-rate” system is based on a social security model developed in 1941 by a British economist 
William Henry Beverage. The principle was to cover all citizens automatically, without previous 
compulsory contributions and without a link to employment, being mainly financed by taxes. 
2 An “earnings-related” system is based on a social insurance model applied in 1883 by a German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. The principle was that of compulsory old-age insurance for low-income 
workers, mainly financed by social security contributions (half from employers, half from employees).   
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countries with a mixed system. Even the ageing population is not a “killer” for the 
PAYG - the efficient although not popular answer may be prolonging of the 
retirement age. Furthermore, a switch from the PAYG to the FF system requires huge 
transition costs (Chapter 3) that impose financial burden on the state budget. For these 
reasons, many countries (e.g. Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Spain, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovenia) concentrate on improving their PAYG and supporting 
voluntary funded schemes rather than on designing the mandatory funding. Moreover, 
debate about the rates of returns of both systems (Chapters 3, 4) suggests that each one 
might offer higher pensions under different conditions. While labor market 
determines pensions in the PAYG, capital market development is crucial for the 
FF system. A combination of both enables to diversify financial sources of future 
pensions between these two more or less independent factors and thus to increase the 
system’s overall stability. 
 
Slovakia has chosen to build a combined system. Compared to some other post-
communist countries it shifts more progressively towards the mandatory funding 
(Table 1). Is this a good decision? What are the main risks and opportunities it 
generates? And what happens with the Slovak PAYG? Is it becoming more efficient? 
Could it be done in a better way? And what tasks and reform options do there remain 
for future governments? These are the main questions analyzed in this paper. 
 
Table 1: Mandatory pension schemes across some post-communist countries  
Country PAYG FF FF introduction  Source 
 (% of gross earnings)   
Kazakhstan 0 10 1998 Andrews (1999) 
Hungary 22 6 1998 ILO (2002) 
Poland 12.22+13 7.3 1999 ILO (2002) 
Latvia* 18 2 2001 OECD (2002, Latvia) 
Croatia 14.5 5 2002 Anusic (2003) 
Estonia 16 6 2002 OECD (2002, Estonia) 
Russia** 24 4 2002 Afanasiev (2003) 
Slovakia 9+6+4.75 9 2005 INEKO 
Czech Republic 26 0 - ILO (2002) 
Slovenia 24.35 0 - ILO (2002) 
* – contribution rate for the FF pillar should gradually increase since 2007 up to 10% 
in 2010 reaching the same proportion for both pillars (10%+10%=20%) 
** – contribution rate for the FF pillar should gradually increase up to 6% resulting in 
22%+6%=28% in 2006 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: Reform Proposal in Slovakia 
 
Contemporary social security system in Slovakia is the un-funded PAYG where 
current workers pay out current pensioners. Since 1997 this system has been 
complemented by a smaller voluntary and private funding. The PAYG covers the old 
age, disability and survival pensions. It is administrated by the Social Insurance 
Agency (SIA), which is a state-owned institution, separated from the state budget. 
Since 1997 the PAYG has generated deficit mainly due to high unemployment (state 
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was paying low contributions for the unemployed people) and high evasions (people 
avoided to pay contributions) – see Figure 1. The evasion may be explained as a result 
of low motivation of people to pay into the system because the old-age pension did 
not sufficiently reflect the amount of contributions paid during their working life 
(Chapter 2). Therefore, people perceived the contributions rather as taxes and avoided 
to pay them.  
 
Financial imbalance was the main reason of gradually decreasing portion of the 
average pension on the average wage (Figure 2). There emerged an increasingly 
widespread belief among new entrants into the labor force and the general public that 
the system could not meet its “promises” in the future. Younger workers were 
becoming skeptical about their prospects as pensioners - trust in the system was 
eroding. Together with hampered motivation, these were the main factors inducing 
willingness of public to reform the old PAYG. Moreover, policy makers and experts 
(Thomay, 2002) anticipated that the expected demography crisis would reveal the 
implicit deficit3 and create further pressure on the PAYG balance. In order to stop the 
growth of the pension system’s deficit and to mobilize individual effort to secure 
suitable living standard in retirement age, the new government decided after the 
parliamentary elections in autumn 2002 to reform the pension system. The legislation 
framework was prepared and adopted in 2003 and the new system should completely 
start to operate in January 2005. In its Program Statement, the government laid down 
the basic feature of new pension system - the introduction of mandatory FF pillar: 
 
“...Important reformatory principle is strict separation of solidarity within the 
society by individual mandatory savings or insurance. Costs of the social 
solidarity have to be covered from clearly named sources. On the other hand, the 
contribution burden should be a tool of personal savings or insurance and should 
be based on strict meritoriousness. 
The government will set up framework for gradual creation of safe and fair 
pension system, based on three main pillars that will be universal for all 
productive citizens. To stop the demography-contingent growth of the un-funded 
pension system’s internal debt and to mobilize individual effort on everyone’s 
living standard in retirement age are goals of the reform. Contributions to the un-
funded pay-as-you-go system should be lowered as much as possible, however 
considering the government’s capacity to assure sources for the Social Insurance 
Agency.” 
 
In April 2003 the Slovak government approved the Conception of the Pension Reform 
in the Slovak Republic. According to this document, better recognition of property 
rights and personal freedom and responsibilities should be assured by shifting as much 
responsibilities as possible to the private sector and individuals. The new system 
should be based on three pillars that will be universal for all productive citizens with 
the temporary exception of armed forces (e.g. soldiers and policemen)4: 
 
• Mandatory, state, un-funded, pay-as-you-go pillar;  
                                                          
3 Here, the implicit pension debt is understood as a negative difference between the present value of all 
future contributions and all future pension payments. 
4 However, there is a political agreement about cancellation of these exceptions in the following years. 
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• Mandatory, private, funded pillar;  
• Voluntary, private, funded pillar5.  
 
Table 2: The rate of mandatory contributions (% of gross wage, paid by employee and employer) 
 Before reform After reform 
 Together Old age Disability Reserve 
PAYG 28% 9% 6% 4.75% 
Funded - 9% - - 
Together 28% 28,75% 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Social affairs and Family in the SR 
  
The rate of the old-age pension contributions will be 9% of the monthly gross wage to 
the (first) PAYG pillar and 9% to the new, mandatory (second) FF pillar. The 
maximum gross wage for paying contributions will go up from SKK 32,000 to triple 
the average gross wage in the economy (roughly SKK 45,000 in 2005). Together with 
higher percentage of contributions this will increase the overall pension contribution 
burden. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: Reform of the PAYG 
 
2.1 Before the reform 
 
Until the end of 2003, each person was entitled to an old age pension after a minimum 
of 25 years of work and attaining a minimum age (men 60 years, women 53-57 years 
of age depending on the number of raised children). For the purpose of computing the 
pension amount, complicated formulas were being used, which basically took into 
account (1) the duration of employment and (2) the average income calculated as an 
average monthly income earned in the “best” five years during the last ten years prior 
to claiming an old age pension. The average monthly income was adjusted in the 
following way: SKK 2,500 was accounted completely; amount between SKK 2,501 
and SKK 6,000 was accounted as one third; amount between SKK 6,001 and SKK 
10,000 as one tenth. The amount above SKK 10,000 was not taken into calculation. 
For instance, adjusted average monthly income of a person earning during five “best” 
years SKK 10,000 monthly on average would be 2,500 + 1,167 + 400 = SKK 4,067, 
which was also the maximum sum. For purpose of the old age pension calculation 
only 50% - 67% share of adjusted monthly average income (depending on the duration 
of employment) was considered. In order to balance newly awarded pensions and 
several-times indexed pensions, the newly awarded pensions were multiplied by a 
given percentage and added a given fixed amount. The final amount of an old age 
pension would be the sum of (1) the share of the adjusted monthly average income, 
(2) the indexed share of the adjusted monthly average income and (3) the fixed 
amount. As shown in Table 3, these calculations were highly re-distributive and 
almost deterred the link between monthly average income and the amount of 
pension. For example monthly income above SKK 10,000 was not considered in 
                                                          
5 The reform of the third pillar is introduced by a proposal of new Law on Supplementary Pension 
Savings. The government has not approved it yet but it should come into force since January 1, 2005. 
The reform should strengthen regulation and supervisory by applying the standards valid for asset 
management companies (independent supervisory authority, strict separation of pension funds from 
pension companies’ assets). The tax exemptions should be substituted by the direct state payments. 
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these calculations although the average monthly gross wage in Slovakia was SKK 
13,511 in 2002. This had negative impact on motivation to pay social security 
contributions. 
 
Table 3: Pensions before the reform of PAYG (before 1.1.2004, in SKK) 
 Duration of employment** 
AMI* 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
7245 6462 6547 6633 6719 6805 6891 6976 7062 
8280 6602 6690 6778 6867 6955 7043 7131 7219 
9315 6743 6833 6924 7014 7105 7195 7286 7376 
10350 6836 6928 7020 7112 7204 7296 7388 7480 
11385 6836 6928 7020 7112 7204 7296 7388 7480 
* Average monthly income earned in the “best” five years of the last ten years of employment. 
** Including school years, compulsory military service and maternity leave. 
Source: INEKO 
 
Indexation of formerly awarded pensions: These were indexed if the cost-of-living 
index, measured by the Statistical Office from monthly household budget surveys 
increased by more than 10%, or the average wage in the economy grew by more than 
5%. Legislation did not specify a fixed percentage of increase and no deadlines for 
valorization. These decisions had to be approved by the government and the 
parliament and were often used as tools for political agenda. 
 
2.2 Reform options 
 
The main problem of almost all PAYG schemes in the world has been identified as 
the inability to finance promises it gave to former contributors. This means an 
increasing financial deficit resulting from the inability to cope with the employment 
(i.e. also demography) crises. This problem is common in all countries with strong so-
called “Defined Benefit” (DB) PAYG plans, where the amount of pension depends 
mainly on variables other than contributions. Regardless what happens with the 
demography or in broader sense with the employment, this system promises a fixed 
replacement rate6 (defined benefit). Therefore, the risk that there will be lack of 
money to finance given promises, remains to the future. The financial deficit is 
usually direct consequence of worsen demography (ageing population). In Slovakia, 
population is relatively young and will remain so for the following decade (Figure 3). 
As mentioned earlier, the financial deficit is rather a consequence of high 
unemployment and low motivation to pay contributions. Because the unemployment 
is a structural problem resulting from the transition process, it can be solved only in a 
longer time period. To solve deficit immediately, the Slovak government had to 
implement so called parametric reform of the PAYG aimed basically at increase of 
the money inflows and decrease of the money outflows in the Social Insurance 
Agency. As the inflows are mainly function of contributions and the outflows are 
mainly function of pensions, there appeared to be following options for the parametric 
reform: 
 
1. Raising the contribution rate; 
2. Prolonging the retirement age; 
                                                          
6 The replacement rate means the ratio of the worker’s first benefits received upon retirement and the 
last pre-retirement gross wage. 
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3. Pensions’ reduction or change in their indexation. 
 
Because the contribution rate (28% of the gross wage) was perceived as already too 
high and pensions too low, the reform relied mainly on a second option. However, 
parametric reform does not solve the motivation problem. Therefore, so-called 
systemic reform of the PAYG was necessary. This required a change of pension 
formula in order to enforce the link between contributions and amount of pension. 
Such a change would represent a shift towards the “Defined Contribution” PAYG, 
an alternative to the “Defined Benefit” system. A good example of such reform is 
Sweden (Palmer, 2000), which replaced its “Defined Benefit” PAYG with so-called 
“Notional Defined Contribution” (NDC) PAYG. In this case, the principle of 
PAYG, when current workers pay out current pensioners, remains the same. However, 
it brings two major innovations: (1) each individual has his/her own notional account 
in the central system, where life-long money inflows and outflows are recorded, and 
(2) the pension is calculated as an account remainder at the chosen time of retirement 
divided by an estimate of life expectancy for an individual of that specific age, i.e. it 
depends heavily on contributions paid during the working life. After retirement, all 
people should receive back money paid in their productive age. Ideally, this money 
should be a personnel property of an individual and should become a part of his/her 
heritage. This should eliminate evasion and maximize the incentive of people to pay 
contributions to the central insurance agency. Of course, NDC remains sensitive to 
employment changes that might be caused by demography crisis. Therefore, to secure 
its long-term financial stability, the system should guarantee flexible reaction on such 
changes. This could be solved by the introduction of so-called automatic stabilizers, 
i.e. automatic parametric reforms of the PAYG explained later in this chapter. 
 
Generally, the Slovak government had several reform options regarding the PAYG: 
 
1. Parametric reform; 
2. Change of the pension formula (link between wages and pensions); 
3. Introduction of DC/NDC instead of DB system; 
4. Introduction of automatic stabilizers. 
 
2.3 After the reform 
 
The reform of the PAYG “first” pillar introduced by a new Law on Social Insurance 
has been approved by the Parliament on September 24, 2003. This Law came into 
force on January 1, 2004. Generally, it brings two major innovations: 
 
1. Parametric reform: Gradual prolonging of statutory retirement age from the 
average 55 years for women and 60 years for men to the final 62 years for both 
genders. All men will retire at the age of 62 since 2006 and all women since 2015. 
 
2. Change of the pension formula: 
 
Equation 1: Pension in reformed PAYG 
 
 
 
ADHStPOMBR **=  
  8 
“St” stands for a number of years of paying contributions to the Social Insurance 
Agency (working period). 
 
“ADH” (Actual Pension Value) is a number given directly by law on basis of special 
calculations aimed at providing the 50% replacement rate in the first year after the 
reform. For 2004 the “ADH” has been set at 183.58. 
 
“POMB” (Average Personal Wage Point) represents the ratio of the individual gross 
wage to the average gross wage in the economy. It is computed as an average of ratios 
respective to each year since 1994 till the last year of employment. For example 
“POMB” 1.00 would mean that the worker has earned the average wage in the 
economy; with 0.50 he has earned half the average wage; with 2.00 twice the average 
wage. Full values of “POMB” below 1.00 and above 1.25 will be employed gradually 
in a three-year transition period. Afterwards, system should offer no re-distribution 
between rich and poor.7 Maximum “POMB” is 3.00 corresponding to the maximum 
base for contributions that is 3-times the average monthly gross wage in the economy. 
 
Compared to the former formula, this one gives higher pension to those who earned 
more and paid higher contributions during their working life and vice versa (Table 4). 
This should increase motivation to pay contributions and eliminate evasion. The 
reduced re-distribution could be dangerous for people with lower income. To avoid 
old-age poverty the new law guarantees minimum pension of 120% of the living 
wages, i.e. SKK 5052 in 2004. People with lower pensions will be supported directly 
from the state budget. 
 
Table 4: Pensions after the reform of PAYG (after 1.1.2004, in SKK) 
 Duration of employment** 
AMI* (POMB) 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 
7245 (0,7) 4498/5052 4626/5052 4755/5052 4883/5052 5012/5052 5140 5269 5397 
8280 (0,8) 5140 5287 5434 5581 5728 5875 6021 6168 
9315 (0,9) 5783 5948 6113 6278 6444 6609 6774 6939 
10350 (1,0) 6425 6609 6792 6976 7160 7343 7527 7710 
11385 (1,1) 7068 7270 7472 7674 7876 8078 8279 8481 
12420 (1,2) 7710 7931 8151 8371 8592 8812 9032 9252 
13455 (1,3) 8128 8360 8592 8825 9057 9289 9521 9754 
14490 (1,4) 8321 8558 8796 9034 9272 9509 9747 9985 
* Average monthly income earned since 1994 till 2003. 
** Including compulsory military service and maternity leave (in a new system, state refrains from 
paying contributions for students and unemployed). 
*** Blue numbers show the minimum pension guaranteed to be paid out from the state budget. 
**** The gap between the lowest and the highest pension will increase further until 2007 when there 
will be zero redistribution.  
Source: INEKO 
 
                                                          
7 The OECD (2004) expects that “the replacement rates will decrease sharply for low wage earners at 
the end of a three-year transition period, and authorities should check if trend wage growth will be 
sufficient to provide a minimum retirement income for all.” 
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Indexation of newly awarded pensions: The Law assumes automatic yearly 
valorization of “ADH” by the average nominal wage growth in the economy.8  
 
Indexation of formerly awarded pensions: The Law assumes so-called “Swiss 
method”, i.e. automatic yearly valorization of awarded pensions by the weighted 
average of the consumer price index (inflation) and the average nominal wage growth 
in the economy. The weights will be 0.5 for both parameters.  
 
Generally, changes in the indexation weaken political influence on pensions’ 
calculation and bind them to the development of economic indicators. This is a good 
message, as the indexation often used to be a subject for political fight. On the other 
hand, the indexation does not fully reflect the change in the sum of money 
collected by the Social Insurance Agency (i.e. changes in the employment, caused 
by demography, migration or unemployment changes) what harms system’s 
sustainability. 
 
Early and late retirement: Unlike in former system, the reformed PAYG allows for 
early and late retirement. Each month of earlier retirement reduces a pension by 0.5% 
and each month of later retirement raises it by 0.5%. 
 
2.4 Recommendations 
 
Although the designed PAYG strengthens the meritoriousness, it is still unable to 
react on employment changes. As these changes have crucial impact on the money 
inflow to the Social Insurance Agency (collected contributions) they represent key 
limiting factors for the amount of pensions. However, neither the pension calculation 
formula nor the indexation rules reflect these changes. The amount of pension in the 
designed PAYG depends basically on four factors: (1) fixed replacement rate 
represented by the variable “ADH” in the formula, (2) nominal wage growth in the 
economy used for the indexation of newly awarded pensions (valorization of “ADH”) 
and formerly awarded pensions, (3) inflation used for the indexation of formerly 
awarded pensions and (4) contributions (indirectly through individual wage and 
working period). Because none of these factors reflects changes in employment, the 
system continues to give non-guaranteed promises. Based on demography 
expectations (Figure 3), this problem might be relevant as soon as in 2015 due to the 
system’s generosity under the expected demography crisis. Partial solution could be 
the indexation of both formerly and newly awarded pensions by the rate of 
change of real money available at the Social Insurance Agency (collected 
contributions).9 In real life this would allow for pension‘s reduction in case of 
poor collection and on opposite pension‘s increase in fruitful years. However, it 
would be dangerous to apply this indexation simultaneously with prolonging the 
retirement age as the latter causes a steep rise in the money collected. 
 
                                                          
8 For simplification the calculation presented in Chapter 4 of this paper assumes that the “ADH” will be 
valorized each year by the average real wage growth in the economy, which is equivalent of the nominal 
wage growth adjusted for the inflation. 
9 The other option would be to index just by inflation that is expected to be lower than the wage growth 
in the following years. However, this is not a systemic sollution as it does not guarantee the system‘s 
stability in the long-term when the inflation could be higher than the wage growth.  
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The proposed prolonging of retirement age will finish in 2015. At the same time 
negative consequences of demography development could affect the economy. In the 
designed PAYG, if the dependency ratio10 hiked rapidly (see also Chapter 4), the SIA 
would collect noticeably less money but it would have to pay out the same or even 
more money on pensions. Thus it would soon go to deficit requiring other reform of 
the PAYG including all the options mentioned earlier.11 Another parametric reform 
would mean further prolonging of retirement age, raising the contributions, change in 
the pension formula and/or change in the pensions’ indexation. Most of these 
decisions are not popular and meet strong resistance from the public and politicians. 
Moreover, perceived inability to fulfill its promises (i.e. to pay out its implicit 
debt) is the main reason why many people and even policy makers believe that 
the PAYG system is not sustainable. Therefore, the goal of a reform should be to 
create a system that would guarantee the ability to meet its promises and become 
sustainable. Technically, such system should respect this basic rule: at given time 
it should distribute among pensioners no more and no less but the money 
collected from the productive work force (after subtracting the administrative 
costs). Hence, it should not be allowed to end up in surplus or deficit. Such a rule is 
rather easy to apply under the minimum “flat-rate” DB PAYG where everybody 
receives the same basic pension serving as a poverty barrier.12 The problems arise 
under the DB PAYG that differentiates pensions and aims at keeping a given 
replacement rate through political decisions. If the replacement rate is too high the 
system runs into deficit that could be covered either by raising the contribution rate or 
by prolonging the retirement age. These measures are unpopular but are likely to be 
accepted if there is a perfect differentiation (i.e. no redistribution between rich and 
poor). However, with too high contributions (and/or too long working life) and too 
high redistribution people seek to avoid paying contributions and system runs again 
into deficit. Thus, the systems’ stability depends on the degree of redistribution or in 
other words on the degree of reflecting the contributions either directly or indirectly 
through reflecting the length of working period and/or the amount of wage. Therefore, 
a shift toward the DC PAYG, where the redistribution is close to zero, increases 
motivation to pay contributions and decreases the risk of deficit. The PAYG 
scheme designed in Slovakia meets these requirements but there are several other 
options. One of them represents the NDC PAYG mentioned earlier, another one could 
be the introduction of a perfect “earnings-oriented” DC PAYG (i.e. with zero 
redistribution) based on a “flat rate” calculation adjusted for relative wage and 
working period of an individual (Equation 2). However, only the last alternative fulfils 
                                                          
10 The dependecny ratio is defined as a measure of the portion of a population which is composed of 
dependents (people who are too old to work). It is equal to the number of individuals in post-productive 
age (for example above 65) divided by the number of individuals in productive age (for example 
between 18 and 64, expressed as a percentage. Thus, a rising dependency ratio is a concern in many 
countries that are facing an aging population, since it becomes difficult for pension and social security 
systems to provide for a significantly older, non-working population. 
11 This view supports also the OECD (2004) report: „The (PAYG) system remains nevertheless 
financially unsustainable in the long term. The planned defined benefit scheme with its strict link 
between contributions and benefits should, upon completion, transform workers’ perception of pension 
contributions from quasi-taxes to quasi-savings. Further changes in the PAYG system are desirable, 
notably the standard retirement age should be raised progressively to 65 for both genders.“ 
12 The collected sum of money after subtracting the administrative costs is simply divided by the 
number of pensioners qualified for the minimum “flat-rate”.  
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the “basic rule” mentioned above (even though indirectly) and directly reflects 
changes in dependency ratio, i.e. employment, and demography changes (Table 6).  
 
For other two alternatives only the introduction of automatic stabilizers would 
guarantee system’s ability to pay out its promises and to secure its long-term financial 
stability. Such stabilizers could include the automatic change in the contribution rate 
and/or in the retirement age as a reaction on changes in the replacement rate and 
consequently in the financial balance of the pension system. To avoid pensioners’ 
poverty and/or too high generosity all three systems could guarantee certain range for 
the replacement rate: for instance 40-50%. If the calculated pension would exceed the 
upper limit the state would pay just this upper limit and save generated surplus for 
worse times and/or lower the contribution rate and/or shorten the retirement age. The 
opposite would apply in other case – falling bellow the lower limit. 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of different types of PAYG 
Type of PAYG Redistribution Reflects contributions Meets “Basic rule” 
Before reform high no no 
After reform zero yes, indirectly no 
NDC zero yes no 
Adjusted “Flat-rate” zero yes, indirectly yes, indirectly 
Source: INEKO 
 
Equation 2: Pension in the DC PAYG calculated from the “flat-rate”  
 
)/(*)/(*)/( SaSWaWNMR =  
 
Table 6: Variables used for computing the pension in the DC PAYG base on the “flat-rate” 
R Pension (at given time “t”) 
M Money collected (at given time “t”) in the central insurance agency 
N Number of pensioners (at given time “t”) in the economy 
M/N “Flat-rate” (at given time “t”) 
W Individual wage (average in working period “S”) 
Wa Average wage in the economy (in working period “S”) 
W/Wa Wage ratio (similar to “Average personal wage point” in 2.3) 
S Working period (number of years of paying contributions) 
Sa Average working period in the economy 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: Introduction of the Mandatory Funded System 
 
The Slovak government officials cited three main arguments in favor of diminishing 
the PAYG and introduction of the second private FF pillar of personal accounts: 
 
1. Inability of PAYG to mobilize individual effort to secure the retirement  
2. Inability of PAYG to solve the threatening demography crises  
3. Higher expected replacement rates 
 
The second chapter showed that the DC/NDC PAYG could eliminate evasion and 
motivate people to pay contributions in order to secure suitable living standard in the 
retirement age. It also showed that any kind of the PAYG remains sensitive to the 
demography crises and is unstable without automatic stabilizers. But are the FF 
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schemes able to cope with demographic crisis? And which system offers higher 
replacement rates, i.e. higher pensions? What are the determining factors? To answer 
these questions, it is necessary to identify the variables conditioning the real rates of 
return of the both funded and unfunded schemes. Before that, a brief description will 
present the main features of the introduced funded pillar. 
 
3.1 Description 
 
The new mandatory FF “second” pillar was introduced by a new Law on Old-Age 
Pension Savings. The Parliament approved it definitely on January 20, 2004, and it 
will come into force starting from January 1, 2005. The infrastructure - mainly 
creation and licensing of new pension companies - should be functioning until the end 
of 2004. All citizens up to a defined age (approximately 52 years) will be allowed to 
choose to enter for the FF pillar since January 2005 till June 2006. Once entering, 
there will be no way back. Young people first entering the labor market and emerging 
self-employees will be obliged to switch. The assets will be managed by private 
pension companies competing on the market. They will be supervised by an 
independent Financial Supervision Authority that should later become a part of the 
Slovak Central Bank. The founders of pension companies will have to be credible 
financial institutions with at least 3-year experience. Minimum basic capital is set to 
SKK 300 million (EUR 7.1 million). Each one will manage three funds with different 
investment limits and different risk & return relationships (see Table 7). Money paid 
to the second pillar will be a private hereditary ownership of savers. It will be 
excluded from the public finances. The interest earned on funds will not be taxed. 
 
Table 7: Pension funds managed by pension companies 
 Equities Bonds & Money Market Instruments Risk & Return 
Growth fund up to 80% no limit high 
Balanced fund up to 50% at least 50% middle 
Conservative fund no stocks 100% low 
Source: Law on Old-Age Pension Savings 
 
Investment portfolio: Equity is too volatile to provide stable income in retirement 
years, although it can be a valuable component of an investment portfolio during the 
accumulation phase. Bonds provide savers with a more stable income, at the cost of 
lower rate of return. For this reason, clients of pension funds invest primarily in 
equity, to gain the advantage of a large, though volatile, return, and then shift 
gradually to bonds as the date of retirement approaches. Allowing for such investment 
strategy was the main reason for creating three different funds in the Slovak system. 
Each saver may hold the assets only in one fund at the same time. Up to 15 years 
before retirement saver may not hold assets in the growth fund and up to 7 years assets 
in the balanced fund. The securities must be traded on a public stock exchange.  
 
Guarantees: The state will guarantee neither a specific performance of pension funds, 
nor the principal value of paid contributions. The life-insurance companies will pay 
out the pensions. In case of fraud or malefaction the state will guarantee 100% of 
granted pension. 
 
Investment restriction: The law states, that the investment into the securities issued 
by Slovak emitters shall be at least 50% of the funds’ portfolio. The advocates of this 
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limitation argued that it should “disable the outflow of domestic capital..., accumulate 
sources for investment into the Slovak economy..., and help to develop the Slovak 
capital market”. However, most economists warn of the restriction’s negative effects. 
Generally, it constrains choosing the best investment opportunities what, if not 
changed, will have negative impact on the rate of return of the funded pillar and 
the amount of pensions. Moreover, the restriction almost deters the sense of the 
growth fund. This is due to the fact, that the Slovak stock market is limited in its size 
and attractiveness and at least half of the assets will have to be invested mainly into 
the fixed-income securities, among them government bonds and state deposits. Thus, 
the upper 80 % limit for equity investment will be hardly achievable. Furthermore, the 
liquidity excess on domestic market might cause a fall in interest rates, i.e. in the rate 
of return of the FF pillar. It also might cause an artificial rise in the price of domestic 
securities and generate a “bubble” that could endanger future pensioners. Moreover, 
through cheaper deficit financing the fall in interest rates would tempt the state to 
higher (and not always effective) expenses. Last but not least, the restriction does not 
comply with the EU rules for free flow of capital and – as shown in the end of this 
chapter – it limits one of key advantages of the FF pillar, namely its ability to face 
the demography crisis. 
 
Transition costs: Creation of the second pillar causes high transition costs appearing 
in several on-coming decades (Tables 8-10). As mentioned in the first chapter these 
costs are a big obstacle for many countries with strong PAYG pillars considering 
switching from the PAYG to the mandatory funded schemes. Transition costs are 
namely a consequence of diverting contributions from the PAYG to the second pillar 
– as a result the center social insurance agency receives less money but it still has to 
pay out the same or similar number of current pensioners. Hence, transition costs 
depend positively on the contribution rate for the funded pillar and on the number of 
people switching. In Slovakia, these costs should not exceed 1% of Slovak GDP 
yearly (in 2005 circa SK 15 billion or EUR 0.36 billion). This is a political 
commitment taken with respect to the Maastricht criteria for the adoption of common 
European currency that require the accession country to keep its fiscal deficit below 
3% of GDP at least two years before the Euro adoption.13 There are several options 
how to finance transition costs: Large part will be covered from (1) the reformed 
PAYG that will generate higher revenues after prolonging the retirement age - the 
link between the introduction of the funded pillar and the need to prolong the 
retirement age is evident (Tables 8-9) – and that will generate sources in the SIA 
reserve fund (4.75% of monthly gross wage, preferably for covering the PAYG 
deficits). Other sources are (2) privatization revenues (government has saved SKK 65 
billion, or EUR 1.55 billion especially for this purpose), (3) state budget and (4) loans. 
To keep transition costs below 1% of GDP, substantial changes effected the original 
reform proposal: the disability insurance (6% of monthly gross wage) went back to the 
PAYG and proposed 10% contribution rate for the FF was decreased to 9%. 
                                                          
13 OECD (2004) warns: “A special issue related to the phasing-in of the second pillar concerns the 
fiscal compensation of the main pillar from the state budget, for the diversion of PAYG contributions. 
These may amount to about one per cent of GDP per year in the short-term and will likely increase in 
the following decades. As long as no agreement is reached with the European institutions for the 
exclusion of such compensation from current expenditures, Slovak authorities will be faced with a 
difficult choice between postponing or down-scaling the second pillar reform, delaying convergence 
with Maastricht rules, or seeking yet further spending cuts.” 
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Note: Expectations presented in Tables 8-10 are calculated under the assumption that more than a half 
of people under 40 years will choose to change for the second FF pillar and more than a half above 40 
years will stay in the PAYG. Transition costs would rise substantially in case of massive switching, and 
would be much lower in case of moderate transfer. For research on willingness to switch see Figure 4. 
 
Table 8: Transition costs (money flowing to the second pillar, in % of GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
0.28 0.97 1.03 1.07 1.13 1.18 1.22 1.28 1.33 
Source: Law on the old age pension saving (Clause on economic and financial impacts) 
 
Table 9: Transition costs after subtracting the PAYG savings (in % GDP) 
2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2015 2018 
0.08 0.26 0.25 -0.08 -0.13 0.04 0.60 
Source: Law on the old age pension saving (Clause on economic and financial impacts) 
Note: The sign “-“ indicates that the PAYG savings will be higher than the transition costs. 
 
Table 10: Transition costs after subtracting the PAYG savings in the long term (in % GDP) 
Scenario 2005 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2070 
A 0.08 -0.08 0.04 0.94 1.82 2.02 1.90 0.64 
B 0.08 -0.63 -1.10 -0.23 0.76 0.94 0.91 0.14 
Source: Law on the old age pension saving (Clause on economic and financial impacts) 
Notes:  
Scenario A – prolonging the retirement age according to the law (up to 62 for both genders) 
Scenario B – prolonging the retirement age up to 65 for both genders (9 months each year) 
The sign “-“ indicates that savings in the PAYG will be higher than the transition costs. 
 
The PAYG savings generated after prolonging the statutory retirement age up to 62 
years for both genders should cover almost all transition costs until 2015 (Table 9). 
The remainder will have to be covered from other sources, e.g. privatization revenues. 
However, the PAYG savings would not be sufficient in case of massive switching for 
the FF pillar. In the long run, even after prolonging the retirement age up to 65 years 
for both genders (Scenario B), there will be a gap in the financial balance of the 
PAYG after 2030 (Table 10). This will be due to the combined effect of demography 
crises and high transition costs. 
 
3.2 “Aaron-Samuelson condition” 
 
As mentioned before, to compare performance of the PAYG and the FF pillars as well 
as their ability to avoid demography crisis, it is necessary to identify factors 
determining the real rates of return. A good deal of analysis of the un-funded social 
security offers so called “Aaron-Samuelson condition” named after seminal articles by 
Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1958). Following this condition, the real rate of return 
in a mature PAYG system is equal to the sum of the growth rate of the labor force and 
the growth rate in productivity (Equation 3), the latter of which can also be expressed 
alternatively as the real wage growth (Orszag 1999, p.17). Since the labor force 
changes only slowly, and wages tend to be a constant fraction of national income, the 
condition implies that in a short run the real return on contributions in a mature PAYG 
scheme will be approximately equal to the growth rate of gross domestic product. 
 
Equation 3: Aaron-Samuelson condition 
 
 ( )gnr +=  
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Table 11: Variables used in Aaron-Samuelson condition 
r Real rate of return in PAYG 
n Rate of growth of the labor force 
g Rate of growth in productivity (real wage growth, sometimes referred to as a speed of 
technological advance) 
 
Participants in the FF scheme are accumulating capital that is invested in the capital 
markets. Thus they earn a return on their investment portfolio that may consist of 
stocks, bonds and other assets. The mechanical application of the “Aaron-Samuelson 
condition” would compare the real rate of return on capital (the return on a funded 
scheme) with the real return on an un-funded scheme, as derived above. However, it is 
necessary to subtract from the gross returns on capital the costs of administration14 
(Equation 4), which are everywhere higher for private than for public pension plans, 
and are particularly high in case of private individual accounts (Willmore 1998).15 
 
Equation 4: Application of the “Aaron-Samuelson condition” 
 
 
 
Table 12: Variables used in Application of the Aaron-Samuelson Condition 
c1 Costs of administration for private pension plans 
c2 Costs of administration for public pension plans 
a Real rate of return on capital (the return on a funded scheme) 
 
The preceding analysis shows that while the performance of the PAYG depends 
on the labor market (real wage growth, population change), the FF depends on 
the capital market. Therefore, the two-pillar pension system diversifies financial 
sources of future pensions. Furthermore, the PAYG is bound to a particular 
geographical area and the FF is thanks to the free flow of capital geographically 
unlimited. Hence, the correlation between rates of return of both pillars is rather 
low and the diversification increases the system’s stability. This argument is 
perhaps the strongest one that supports the idea of a combined pension system. 
 
3.3 Demography crises and the Stock Market 
 
This section analyzes the effect of change in demography on the real rate of return on 
capital. It is obvious that fewer people at work, they need to be more productive in 
order to produce the same output. Thus, the performance of company producing this 
output and the price of its shares depend not only on technology but also on the 
number of workers employed. Fewer the workers lower the price of shares (rate of 
return on capital) holding other things such as labor productivity constant. The idea 
that demographic forces have a powerful impact on economic activity more generally 
– on capital accumulation and output – and hence on the stock market, is far from 
                                                          
14 This paper does not include administrative cost analysis. Therefore, in the following discussion, the 
net terms of the real rate of return in the PAYG as well as in the FF system is considered. The “net 
return” means the return adjusted for the costs of administration and possible taxes.  
15 Thomay (2003, p. 8) writes: “...in the proposed (FF) model, we can expect high administrative costs 
reaching in the beginning 5-10% of the assets accumulated on individual accounts and in the long term 
1-2%, what is still 5-10 times more than administrative costs in the pay-as-you-go system. In a 40-year 
saving period the administrative costs of 1% cut down the pension about 20% and of 2% about 35%.” 
For further analysis on administrative costs see also Horváth, Lendacký (2003). 
( ) ( )21 ? cacgn −≥≤−+
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new. It formed the basis for the classic studies of Kuznets (1958, 1961) on the 
influence of long swings in the growth of population on capital accumulation and the 
stock market in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. More recently the controversial 
paper of Mankiw and Weil (1989) studied the impact of predictable demographic 
change on the housing market and Geanakoplos and Magill (2002) developed 
predictability model of the stock market based on demography expectations. Their 
model supports the view that a substantial fall in the price-earnings ratio is likely in 
the next 20 years in the US economy as a consequence of negative demographic 
development. Similar results can be observed using the stock market supply-demand 
analysis. The assumption is that all workers are willing to buy shares in order to 
accumulate capital for later retirement and all pensioners are willing to sell shares in 
order to get money for consumption. With the demography crisis the number of 
workers falls while the number of pensioners rises, holding the retirement age 
constant. More pensioners are willing to sell their shares - higher is the supply on the 
stock market. On the other hand, fewer workers are willing to buy shares - lower is the 
demand for these shares on the stock market. As shown in the Figure 5, demography 
crisis causes a rightward shift of the supply curve, and a leftward shift of the demand 
curve resulting in the fall of stock prices and the rate of return on capital. 
 
In summary, if capital is accumulated in an economy with changing labor force, 
the rate of return on capital is changing as well and its expectations need to be 
adjusted for “n” or the rate of change in labor force. Therefore, holding other 
things equal, the country with negative demography expectations can avoid 
possible downturn in the rate of return of its FF pension system only if it exports 
capital to the economy with stable or positive demography changes. 
 
This is quite a strong conclusion, because it shows that there is a possibility how to 
avoid the employment or demography crises in the funded scheme. While the PAYG 
is bound to the particular geographical area and can solve these problems only through 
prolonging the retirement age or increasing the contribution rate, the funded scheme 
may take the advantage of free movement of capital and export the pension savings 
into the country with higher technological advance and/or with better demographic 
development. However, Table 13 shows that the expected demography crisis is a 
world - wide phenomena and that also profiting from free flow of capital has its 
limitations. Moreover, as explained earlier, the restriction that binds at least 50% of 
investment portfolio to Slovak securities presents another administrative barrier. 
 
Table 13: World demography changes 
Portion of population above 65 years (v %) Support ratio: (20-59 years)/( above 60 years) 
 2000 2015 Difference 2000 2040 Difference  
Argentina 9.7 10.7 1.0 2.4 1.4 1.0 Sweden 
Russia 12.5 13.8 1.3 2.9 1.8 1.1 Russia 
India 5.0 6.4 1.4 2.6 1.5 1.1 Great Britain 
Turkey 5.8 7.2 1.4 2.7 1.5 1.2 France 
Indonesia 4.8 6.4 1.6 3.8 2.4 1.3 Argentina 
USA 12.3 14.4 2.1 2.9 1.6 1.3 Hungary 
Mexico 4.7 6.8 2.1 2.4 1.1 1.3 Italy 
Brazil 5.1 7.3 2.2 2.5 1.1 1.3 Germany 
Slovakia 11.4 13.7 2.3 2.4 1.1 1.3 Japan 
China 6.9 9.3 2.4 3.4 1.8 1.6 Poland 
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Chile 7.2 9.7 2.5 3.4 1.7 1.7 USA 
France 16.0 18.6 2.6 3.3 1.3 2.0 Czech Republic 
Poland 12.1 14.8 2.7 3.7 1.6 2.1 Slovakia 
Hungary 14.6 17.4 2.8 6.4 3.3 3.1 India 
Great Britain 15.8 18.9 3.1 5.2 2.2 3.1 Chile 
Italy 18.1 22.4 4.3 7.1 3.6 3.6 Turkey 
Germany 16.4 21.0 4.6 5.6 2.0 3.6 China 
Sweden 17.4 22.3 4.9 7.1 2.9 4.2 Indonesia 
Czech Republic 13.8 18.7 4.9 7.0 2.7 4.3 Brazil 
Japan 17.2 25.8 8.6 7.6 2.8 4.8 Mexico 
Source: Human Development Report 2002, UNDP Source: The World Bank 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: Replacement rates in the PAYG and the FF 
 
To analyze the ability of pension system to offer adequate pensions (in terms of 
replacement rates), INEKO developed theoretical calculations for the funded pension 
system, the PAYG designed in Slovakia (after the reform)16, and the DC PAYG. 
 
 
4.1 Fully Funded Pension System 
 
In the funded pillar the pension depends on the amount of money that the worker 
saved on his personal account during his working life and on the net rate of return on 
that savings that the pension company (and/or life insurance company) was earning 
during the saving (and/or retirement) period. The amount of money saved depends on 
the contribution rate, the wage and the length of saving period. 
 
Table 14: Variables used in the calculation of pension under the FF pillar 
W Monthly gross wage of worker at the time when he starts to save 
c Contribution rate (percentage of monthly gross wage that the worker saves on his personal 
account) 
g Average yearly real wage growth during the working life of worker 
a Average yearly real rate of return on savings earned by pension company during the savings and 
the retirement period after subtracting all administration fees and taxes (net appreciation) 
S Savings at the time when worker retires 
St Savings period 
R Average monthly pension 
Rt Retirement period 
r Replacement rate for the funded system (ratio of average monthly pension to monthly gross 
wage earned at the last month of working life) 
 
Note: The contribution rate “c” and the average real wage growth “g” are assumed to 
be constant during the productive life of individual. The average real rate of return on 
savings “a” is assumed to be constant during his/her productive life and retirement 
period. In real life “a” tends to be higher at the beginning of savings period and 
decreases as retirement approaches and investment portfolio gets less risky. 
 
Equations: 
                                                          
16 The calculation for the designed PAYG is based on the formula described in the second chapter. 
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The amount of savings at the time when worker retires is computed using the formula 
for geometrical series with the combined cumulative effect of real wage growth and 
real rate of return on capital. 
 
Equation 5: Savings in fully funded system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average monthly pension is computed as an annuity resulting from the amount of 
savings. Simplifying assumption is made, that the remainder on personal account 
during retirement is appreciated at the same rate “a” as it was during savings period: 
 
Equation 6: Pension in fully funded system 
 
 
 
 
 
The replacement rate for funded system is computed as a ratio of average monthly 
pension to monthly gross wage earned at the last month of individual’s working life: 
 
Equation 7: Replacement rate in fully funded system 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 PAYG based on the DC system 
 
In the DC PAYG with zero redistribution the pension depends on the past 
contributions and on the money available at the central insurance agency at the time of 
pension payment. This money is equal to the actual sum of contributions collected 
from the productive part of population, so it depends on the actual employment in 
society and on the actual contribution rate. The employment depends on demography, 
retirement age, unemployment rate and immigration. The following theoretical 
calculation considers the system that is purely contribution-defined and offers zero re-
distribution between rich and poor. The central insurance agency distributes all 
collected money among pensioners. The pension reflects fully the relative length of 
working life and the relative amount of paid contributions. 
 
Table 15: Variables used in calculation of pension under the DC PAYG 
W Monthly gross wage of worker at the time when he starts to pay contributions to PAYG 
Wa Average monthly gross wage in the economy at the time when worker starts to pay contributions 
to PAYG 
c Contribution rate (percentage of monthly gross wage paid by worker to PAYG) 
g Average yearly real wage growth during working life of worker 
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Dt Support ratio in 2002, Dt = 2.8346 
D Support ratio at the time of retirement 
S Money paid to PAYG up to the time when the worker retires 
St Length of contribution paying (working life) 
R Average monthly pension 
Rt Retirement period 
r Replacement rate in PAYG (ratio of average monthly pension to monthly gross wage earned at 
the last month of working life) 
Note: Support ratio is computed as a number of people employed in the economy divided by the 
number of retired people. 
 
Assumptions: 
 
Base year: For purpose of this theoretical calculation it is necessary to track the 
changes in the support ratio. As a base year serves 2002 (Dt = 2.8346). 
 
Constant arguments: Contribution rate to the PAYG system “c” is assumed to be 
constant during productive life and retirement period of individual. The average real 
wage growth “g” is assumed to be constant during productive life of individual. 
 
Expected changes in the rate of unemployment: The number of unemployed people 
is counted out of the working force. The assumption is made that the working force 
(people ready to work, i.e. employed plus unemployed) makes up 83% (actual number 
in 2002) of people in productive age and will be constant until 2050. 
 
Table 16: Expected changes in the rate of unemployment 
Year 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
% 18.5 11.6 10.0 8.0 6.0 5.0 
Source: Conception of the Pension Reform in the Slovak Republic, April 2003 
 
Demography changes: Demographic Research Center in Bratislava forecasted 
several scenarios of demography changes in Slovakia. All of them consider possible 
effects of migration. Most probably, the population should be around the “middle” 
scenario used in this calculation. For better illustration, the calculation presents also 
results obtained under the demography status quo (“no-change” scenario). 
 
Support ratio (i.e. inversed dependency ratio): Figure 3 displays expected changes 
in the dependency ratio for the middle demography scenario and the retirement age 62 
and 65 for both genders.17 It shows dramatic upturn after 2015.18 
 
Equations:  
 
This calculation is an approximation to the model described at the end of Chapter 2 
(DC PAYG based on the “flat-rate”). The average monthly pension of particular 
individual is computed as an average contribution paid into the central insurance 
agency during the retirement period of that individual adjusted for: 
                                                          
17 The calculation considers changing retirement age from 60 to 65 for both genders. 
18 The calculation takes into regard also disabled people, students, people in military service and people 
on maternity leave who are not included in the number of employed people. The assumption is that this 
group makes up 13% (actual number in 2002) of people in productive age and will be constant until 
2050. The data is also adjusted for expected changes in the unemployment. 
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1. Wage ratio (W/Wa) - ratio of the wage that this individual has earned during his 
productive life to the average wage in the economy in respective period 
2. Change in the support ratio (D/Dt) – support ratio at the time of retirement over 
the present support ratio (in 2002) 
3. Ratio of the working life to the retirement period (St/Rt) 
 
Equation 8: Pension in PAYG 
 
 
 
The replacement rate for PAYG system is computed as the ratio of average monthly 
pension to monthly gross wage earned at the last month of working life of individual: 
 
Equation 9: Replacement rate in PAYG 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Conclusions 
 
Following tables display replacement rates under the FF and the PAYG pension 
systems respective to different real wage growths and real rates of return. The results 
have been computed for the average-wage-worker under the assumptions of 10% 
contribution rate, 40-year productive life, 20-year retirement period, and legal 
retirement age of 65 for both genders. 
 
Table 17: Replacement rates in the FF pillar 
Funded Real Wage Growth 
 % -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
-5 11.18 9.08 7.50 6.30 5.36 4.63 4.04 3.57 3.19 2.87 2.61 
-4 15.82 12.67 10.32 8.54 7.18 6.12 5.29 4.62 4.09 3.65 3.29 
-3 22.56 17.82 14.30 11.67 9.68 8.14 6.95 6.01 5.26 4.65 4.15 
-2 32.39 25.22 19.97 16.07 13.14 10.91 9.19 7.86 6.80 5.95 5.27 
-1 46.75 35.93 28.06 22.28 17.97 14.72 12.24 10.33 8.84 7.65 6.71 
0 67.81 51.48 39.69 31.09 24.74 20.00 16.42 13.68 11.56 9.90 8.58 
1 98.74 74.11 56.46 43.67 34.30 27.36 22.17 18.23 15.21 12.87 11.03 
2 144.2 107.1 80.68 61.66 47.84 37.68 30.13 24.46 20.16 16.85 14.27 
3 211.0 155.3 115.8 87.49 67.09 52.20 41.23 33.05 26.89 22.19 18.58 
4 309.2 225.5 166.6 124.6 94.53 72.72 56.75 44.93 36.10 29.43 24.34 
R
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5 453.1 328.0 240.2 178.1 133.7 101.8 78.53 61.46 48.79 39.29 32.10 
 
Note: 
While evaluating the results one has to have in mind that the real rate of return on 
capital under the funded system has not been adjusted for changes in employment. 
 
Table 18: Replacement rates in the PAYG pillar 
PAYG Real Wage Growth 
 % -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Middle 7.08 7.71 8.41 9.20 10.08 11.07 12.19 13.45 14.87 16.48 18.30 
No change 22.50 24.45 26.67 29.14 31.92 35.07 38.60 42.60 47.11 52.21 57.97 
Designed 21.01 21.23 21.45 21.68 21.90 22.12 22.34 22.56 22.78 23.00 23.22 
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Note: 
Replacement rates of the PAYG are computed after 40 years of saving, i.e. sometimes 
in 2042. Considerably lower replacement rates under the “middle” scenario are a 
result of negative demography expectations.  
 
Conclusion 1: 
The designed PAYG is more generous than the DC PAYG in all cases except for 
the unrealistic “no change” scenario of demography development. This is due to 
the fact, that the formula used for pension calculation under the designed PAYG 
does not reflect demography changes. As a consequence the designed PAYG will 
be unsustainable if the negative demography expectations will come true. 
 
Figure 6 displays the performance of the FF pillar, the designed PAYG and the DC 
PAYG pillars (“middle” scenario of demography changes). It displays relationship 
between real wage growth and replacement rate. Performance of the funded pillar is 
tested at the same rate of net appreciation and real wage growth. 
 
Conclusion 2: 
The designed PAYG outperforms the funded pillar up to the 1% growth of real 
wage and appreciation. The opposite holds for the higher growth rates. The DC 
PAYG offers lower replacement rates at all levels of real wage growth and 
appreciation. The “Aaron-Samuelson condition” indicates that the difference in 
pension under the same rate of return on capital “a” and real wage growth “g” 
may be explained by change in the labor force. Hence, lower pension under the 
DC PAYG reflects the negative change in labor force what is in line with the 
actual expectations of the Demographic Research Center in Slovakia. 
 
Figure 7 shows the performance of the funded system and the DC PAYG “no-change” 
scenario with legal retirement age of 60 and 65. As before, the performance is tested 
at the same rate of net appreciation and real wage growth, but results for the PAYG 
have been computed under constant 15% unemployment rate. 
 
Conclusion 3: 
The replacement rates in the DC PAYG/65 “no-change” scenario are 
significantly higher than in the funded system. According to the “Aaron-
Samuelson condition” this might be explained by the increase of labor force after 
prolonging the legal retirement age from the average 55 years for women and 60 
years for men to 65 years for both genders. Almost identical curves of the funded 
system and the DC PAYG/60 “no-change” scenario indicate that if the 
employment does not change in the economy and the net appreciation equals the 
real wage growth, both systems provide for almost the same pension. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper evaluates the pension reform proposal in Slovakia according to these 
criteria: (1) motivation of people to pay social contributions and to secure their living 
standard in the retirement age, (2) transition costs (3) guarantees of financial stability 
and (4) providing the adequate pensions (in terms of replacement rate). 
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Motivation 
 
The DB PAYG before the reform almost deterred the link between income and 
pension. This had negative impact on motivation to pay the social security 
contributions and on the financial balance of the PAYG. The reform strengthens the 
link between work (income) and reward (pension). Together with the introduction of 
funded system that is purely DC this has positive impact on motivation. 
 
Stability & Financial sustainability  
 
If the expectations of the Demographic Research Center will come true, Slovakia will 
face demography crises and negative change in its labor force mainly after 2015. The 
PAYG will not be able to meet its promises, because its pension formula does not 
reflect changes in the employment and is too generous. This would require another 
reform - either parametric with further prolonging of retirement age and/or change of 
the pension formula, or systemic with the introduction of the DC/NDC PAYG. In both 
cases only the introduction of automatic stabilizers will secure system’s long-term 
financial stability. However, any kind of PAYG remains sensitive to demography 
changes. Any country facing demography crisis can avoid possible downturn in the 
rate of return of its pension system only if it introduces the FF pillar and exports 
capital to the economy with stable or positive demography changes. In Slovakia, the 
restriction that binds at least 50% of the investment portfolio to Slovak securities 
limits this key advantage and will have to be reconsidered. Nevertheless, as the labor 
market determines pensions in the PAYG and the capital market development is 
crucial for the FF system, a combination of both enables to diversify risk between two 
more or less independent factors and thus to increase the overall system’s stability. 
 
Transition costs 
 
Creation of the second pillar causes high transition costs appearing in several on-
coming decades. These costs depend positively on the contribution rate for the funded 
pillar and on the number of people switching. With 9% contribution rate, Slovakia 
will have the biggest FF pillar in Europe and one of the biggest in the world. Until 
2015, almost all transition costs should be covered from the PAYG savings generated 
mainly thanks to the prolonged retirement age. However, these savings would not be 
sufficient in case of massive switching. In the long run, even after prolonging the 
retirement age up to 65 years for both genders there will be a gap in the PAYG 
financial balance after 2030. This will be a combined result of demography crisis and 
high transition costs appearing due to the FF pillar introduction. It will have to be 
covered from other sources - mainly privatization revenues, state budget and loans. 
 
Replacement rates 
 
The PAYG replacement rates depend mainly on the real wage growth and the 
demography changes (i.e. labor market). The FF replacement rates depend mainly on 
the net asset appreciation (i.e. capital market). If labor force remains constant (for 
example thanks to the immigration) and the net appreciation equals the real wage 
growth, both systems provide for almost the same pension. With higher real wage 
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growth, the PAYG offers higher pensions and on contrary, higher asset appreciation 
speaks in favor of the FF. Expecting the real convergence INEKO assumes that the 
real wage growth in Slovakia will accelerate after the country’s accession into the EU. 
This might make it more advantageous to stay in the PAYG for people with less than 
15-20 years before retirement. In addition, the real returns of both pillars have to be 
adjusted for the costs of administration that are everywhere higher for private than for 
public pension plans, and are particularly high in case of private individual accounts.    
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FIGURES: 
 
Figure 1: Contributors & beneficiaries versus unemployment rate in Slovakia 
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Source: Social Insurance Agency (Payers & Pensioners), Statistical Office of the SR 
(Rate of Unemployment) 
 
Figure 2: Development of average wages and average pensions in Slovakia 
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Source: Social Insurance Agency, Statistical Office of the SR 
 
Figure 3: Expectations of the dependency ratio development in Slovakia 
Expectations in Dependency Ratio Development
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Source: Demographic Research Centre in the SR 
Note: Dependency ratio equals the number of people above the retirement age divided 
by the number of people between 18 and retirement age. The expectations correspond 
to the most probable “middle scenario” of demography development. 
 
Figure 4: Research on peoples’ willingness to switch for the second FF pillar 
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Voting results as of February 12, 2004
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Source: INEKO  
Note: Research was taken on the INEKO website since May 2003 until February 2004 
on the sample of 912 people. 
 
Figure 5: Influence of demography crisis on capital market (stock prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INEKO  
 
Figure 6: Performance of FF and PAYG (designed, middle scenario) pillars  
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Source: INEKO 
 
Figure 7: Performance of the FF and the PAYG (“no-change” scenario) 
Performance of Pillars (if g=a)
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Source: INEKO 
